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identity and the Japan-South Korea trade dispute
Chris Deacon
Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political
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ABSTRACT
Japan-South Korea relations have consistently been presented by
International Relations scholars as a puzzle that confounds mainstream ration-
alist theories, which struggle to explain the consistent acrimony associated
with the so-called ‘history problem’. While many scholars have, therefore,
adopted conventional constructivist approaches to incorporate history into
their analyses, such literature often neglects the processes of (re)construction
of this social reality, thereby implicitly treating these negative sentiments as
essentialised elements of Korean and Japanese culture/identity which cause
certain foreign policies. Using the recent Japan-South Korea trade dispute as
a case study, this article instead draws on critical constructivist/poststructural-
ist theory and discourse analytical methods to examine how the ‘history
problem’ is produced and reproduced. It argues that dominant discourses of
remembering in South Korea, which represent Japan as an unrepentant colo-
nial aggressor, and of forgetting in Japan, which represent South Korea as
emotional and irrational for dwelling on the past, act to (re)produce identities
that clash in their attitudes to difficult history. While such foreign policy prac-
tices (re)produce dominant national identities, these identities also shape the
bounds of which foreign policies are legitimate or imaginable. This mutually
constitutive relationship between identity and foreign policy continually repro-
duces the ‘history problem’ in Japan-South Korea relations.
KEYWORDS Japan; South Korea; history problem; memory; identity, discourse
Introduction
‘We will never again lose to Japan’, declared Moon Jae-in, President of the
Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), on 2 August 2019. His words came
moments after the Japanese cabinet approved the removal of the ROK
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from its ‘whitelist’ of trusted trading partners, having already introduced
certain export controls earlier in July. Even to the uninformed observer,
however, Moon’s remarks clearly drew from something more than a con-
temporary trade dispute of relatively narrow focus. His usage of the word
‘again’ and the remainder of his statement – ‘we have come this far today
by overcoming countless hardships’ – alluded to far deeper sources of acri-
mony than trade spats alone; allusions to the suffering of Korea during the
period of Japan’s colonial rule from 1910 to 1945. This was the historical
context for why Koreans must not ‘lose’ to Japan ‘again’, no matter the
nature of the dispute. Captured in this language, therefore, is the extent to
which memory of this difficult history is a constant fixture in disputes
between South Korea and Japan, even those ostensibly unrelated to it. The
contemporary bilateral relationship is characterised by consistent antagon-
ism and vitriol in relation to this past; indeed, following the onset of this
particular dispute, Japan-ROK relations are widely considered to be at their
lowest point since normalisation in 1965. Using the trade dispute as a case
study, this article examines how the so-called ‘history problem’ in Japan-
ROK relations is continually produced and reproduced.
The relationship between Japan and South Korea has consistently
been presented by scholars of International Relations (IR) as a puzzle that
confounds the expectations of mainstream rationalist theory (see, among
others, Cha, 1999; Jackson, 2018; Ku, 2016; Lee, 2013; Park, 2008).
Specifically, it is deemed confounding that, in the realist case, two
regional allies of the United States (US) who supposedly share common
security threats and, in the liberal case, two liberal democracies with
strong trade and cultural relations have such a poor bilateral relationship.
Regarding realist assumptions, Victor Cha, for example, writes of relations
‘marred persistently by friction’ even ‘despite the existence of shared
threats from the Soviet Union, China and North Korea and generally con-
vergent security interests’. Explaining this is posed as ‘a difficult task for
the Realist school of thought in international relations, according to
which states with common allies and common enemies should be
friendly’ (Cha, 1999, pp. 1–2). Similarly, regarding liberal assumptions,
Van Jackson argues that, as ‘liberal democracies [who] both embrace
popular elections, individual rights, and minority protections … shar[e]
both popular and traditional cultural influences that include extensive
people-to-people ties … [with] their economies bound together by high
amounts of trade and direct investment … Japan and South Korea
should get along rather well’ (Jackson, 2018, pp. 128–129). Despite these
frameworks appearing to be ineffective in understanding Japan-South
Korea relations, and most scholars therefore going on to modify or depart
from them, this supposed puzzle is repeated at the outset of virtually
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every piece of IR scholarship examining this relationship (and generally
not in the reflexive manner intended here), illustrating the continued
prominence of rationalist theory as a default starting point for examining
this relationship.
In seeking to ‘solve’ this ‘puzzle’, most analyses aim to incorporate idea-
tional factors relating to the so-called the ‘history problem’ (K: yoksa munje;
J: rekishi mondai) in Japan-South Korea relations – the common term for a
set of interrelated disputes regarding Japan’s wartime and colonial conduct
during the first half of the twentieth century, including, but not limited to:
the ‘comfort women’ issue; the forced labour issue; Yasukuni Shrine (espe-
cially visits there by Japanese politicians); the territorial dispute regarding
Dokdo/Takeshima; and history textbooks discussing many of these issues
(see Hasegawa & Togo, 2008). This attention to history broadly comes in
the form of either a ‘conventional’ constructivist analysis or, more com-
monly, a synthetic analysis which aims to incorporate both rationalist and
conventional constructivist elements.1 In particular, there has been a focus
on conflicting identities, or other ‘cultural’ factors, relating to this difficult
history in Japan and South Korea. Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder
(2015), for example, have argued that an ‘identity clash’ between South
Korea and Japan causes ruptures in their bilateral relationship, while Ji
Young Kim (2014, p. 32) suggests that ‘history disputes generate diplomatic
conflict between South Korea and Japan because they function as emotion-
laden symbols’. It is often claimed, in particular, that anti-Japanese senti-
ment is a core element of Korean national identity (Swenson-Wright, 2012),
with opinion polling – such as a 2013 survey showing 98% of South
Koreans believe Japan has not sufficiently apologised for the past (Pew,
2013) – frequently cited in support.
Such analyses of identity clashes and history-driven disputes, while con-
vincing in their pinpointing of the most relevant factors in understanding
this relationship, have generally been somewhat limited in their explanation
for how this ‘social reality’ is produced and reproduced, however. Firstly,
most provide little in-depth theorisation of or accounting for the underlying
processes of identity construction occurring in both states. Glosserman and
Snyder (2015), for example, analyse polling data and interviews to ascertain
the nature/components of these identities, but without an account of how
these identities came to be this way (and, indeed, remain this way).
Meanwhile, in an example of a synthetic analysis, Sheryn Lee (2013) dis-
cusses the role of ‘cultural and historical factors’ alongside material strategic
imperatives, but without delving into the construction of the former. Such
scholarship, by leaving out explanations or theorisation as to how these
identities/cultures are constructed and reconstructed, implicitly positions
them as somehow given; a ‘natural’ result of the relevant historical events.
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Secondly, and relatedly, such analyses also tend to imply a one-way causal
relationship between these identities/cultures (or relevant history) and the
foreign policy that constitutes the ‘history problem’ – because ‘identity
shapes interests, and interests determine foreign policy’ (Glosserman &
Snyder, 2015, p. 18) – thereby missing out how such foreign policy practi-
ces themselves also shape national identities. Given these limitations, such
literature also tends to lack explicit theorisation of how memory of this his-
tory features in these processes of identity construction, other than some-
what superficial allusions.
As I explain in further detail in my theoretical discussion below, we can
understand such scholarship as broadly following (or, at least, incorporat-
ing, in the case of synthetic work) a ‘conventional’ constructivist approach
(see also note 1). What is lacking from the literature, therefore, are more
‘critical’ constructivist and poststructuralist perspectives. Such approaches
have much to offer in terms of their emphasis on the discursive nature of
identity construction and the mutually constitutive relationship between
such identities and foreign policy. Scholars allied to more critical theoretical
approaches also have much of interest to say about the role of memory in
these processes which would be of great use here. Research examining
relational identity construction between Japan and its neighbours that
takes discursive representations seriously is belatedly beginning to emerge,
particularly among scholars outside of North America. Taku Tamaki (2010),
for example, has analysed Japanese identity construction in terms of
‘Othering’ narratives regarding South Korea; although he rejects both con-
structivist and poststructuralist approaches, arguing for what he describes
as a ‘realist’ ontology that allows for ‘resilient’ identities. Linus Hagstr€om
and Karl Gustafsson (2015), in a special edition of The Pacific Review, mean-
while, have taken issue with ‘norm constructivist’ analyses of Japan’s iden-
tity and made a more explicitly poststructuralist argument against the
possibility of ‘material’ factors constituted and understood independently
of their discursive construction. While also emphasising relational identity
construction, they argue in particular for a ‘layered’ or ‘sedimented’ under-
standing of Japanese identity, with varying levels of institutionalisation, so
as to better explain continuity and change in Japan’s identity.
Accompanying their work were more specific examinations of the discursive
production of relational Japanese identity vis-a-vis South Korea (Bukh,
2015) and China (Gustafsson, 2015; Suzuki, 2015). Hagstr€om and Gustafsson
(2019) – while still explicitly adopting a critical constructivist/poststructural-
ist approach – have since also argued for the importance of ‘narrative
power’, as a sub-category of discourse, in East Asian international politics.
Gustafsson has also focused, broadly within this theoretical perspective, on
the role of memory in Sino-Japanese relations in particular (Gustafsson,
4 C. DEACON
2014, 2015). Such research regarding Japan is extremely promising but is
still limited even after these initiatives and deserves to be developed fur-
ther. There has also been scant examination of these processes of discursive
identity construction occurring in South Korea (in relation to Japan or
otherwise). In particular for my purposes here, lacking from the existing lit-
erature is an analysis which examines Japan-South Korea relations on both
sides – necessary to better understand the bilateral ‘history problem’ –
using a critical constructivist/poststructuralist theoretical approach which
emphasises discursive identity construction and takes account of the role of
memory in these processes.
In this article, therefore, I aim at least to begin to develop this research
agenda by examining how the ‘history problem’ is produced and reproduced,
and to encourage further research that utilises and develops this theoretical
approach to Japan-South Korea relations. This question seeks to get at the
processes through which the ‘history problem’ is socially constructed, resisting
the reification of its constituent elements. It may also be thought of as a ‘how-
possible’ question (Doty, 1993): How has it been possible that the social reality
of the ‘history problem’ has been produced and continues to be reproduced?
Under what conditions and through which processes has this possibility mani-
fested? I aim to address these questions by drawing on poststructuralist
approaches to IR and conducting a discourse analysis of Japanese and South
Korean texts relating to the recent trade dispute between these states.
Following this introduction, I set out a brief background of my case
study and explain its selection. I then discuss the broader literature relating
to memory and identity in international politics and explain the theoretical
perspective and methodological approach I adopt in this article. Following
this, I conduct a discourse analysis of the trade dispute in South Korea and
Japan, in which I document the discursive (re)production of dominant
(South) Korean and Japanese identities which, I argue, are constituted by
juxtaposing attitudes to colonial and wartime history. In the South Korean
case, these dominant discourses seek to remember this past and represent
Japan as an unrepentant colonial aggressor; while in the Japanese case,
they seek to forget this past and represent (South) Korea(ns) as emotional
and irrational for dwelling on it. Finally, I relate these observations back to
the theory employed in this article in further detail and discuss the implica-
tions for our understanding of the broader ‘history problem’. I argue that,
while such discursive foreign policy practices act to (re)produce dominant
Japanese and (South) Korean identities, these constructions of identity also
define the bounds of which foreign policy practices vis-a-vis the other state
are understood as permissible, legitimate or imaginable. Thus, through a
mutually constitutive relationship between identity and foreign policy,
these dominant (South) Korean and Japanese identities depend upon
THE PACIFIC REVIEW 5
continued conflict regarding the relevant history to sustain their own coher-
ence and dominance. Such processes are by no means unique to the trade
dispute, which is merely an example of the much broader practices of the
‘history problem’, continually (re)produced through these processes.
The trade dispute
The factual timeline of the Japan-South Korea trade dispute, beginning in
2019 and still on-going at the time of writing, has been outlined in detail in
multiple sources (see, for example, CSIS, 2019), so I set out here only a brief
background of the main events up to the end of 2019 – the period of my ana-
lysis – to provide context for my arguments. The trade dispute proper began
on 1 July 2019, when the Japanese government announced restrictions on the
export to the ROK of certain chemicals vital to the production of semiconduc-
tors – a major South Korean industry – citing national security concerns. Initial
attempts to resolve the situation failed and a public boycott of Japanese goods
also began across South Korea. On 2 August, Tokyo escalated the dispute by
removing the ROK from its ‘whitelist’ of trusted trading partners, delaying cer-
tain exports through the addition of security checks. Within weeks, the ROK
government took retaliatory action, removing Japan from its own ‘whitelist’.
Subsequently, talks seeking compromise continued to fail, while bilateral trade
fell significantly (Stangarone, 2020).
This trade spat, however, began in the context of another bilateral dis-
pute. Although the Japanese government has insisted that its export con-
trol measures stemmed from national security concerns, it is generally
understood that the trigger for Tokyo’s actions was in fact South Korean
court decisions regarding wartime forced labour (Council on Foreign
Relations, 2019). In a series of judgments from October 2018 to January
2019, ROK courts held that Korean victims of Japan’s forced mobilisation of
labour during its colonial rule were entitled to compensation from several
Japanese conglomerates who benefited from this labour. To provide this
compensation, courts then also ordered the seizure of shares held by these
Japanese companies in ROK-based entities (J. Lee, 2019). The Japanese gov-
ernment, however, pointed to the 1965 Japan-ROK normalisation treaty
which, it argues, settled all claims stemming from the colonial period, and
demanded that the South Korean government speak out against the court
rulings. When President Moon refused to do so, Japan called for an arbitra-
tion panel to decide on the issue, but this was rejected by Seoul (DW,
2019). In this way, the trade dispute should not be considered in isolation,
but rather in the context of the forced labour dispute occurring in parallel.
The trade dispute’s recency means that it provides a valuable insight into
the contemporary state of Japan-South Korea relations, but has yet to receive
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substantial academic attention. The dispute also appears prime facie to be an
exemplary case of a dispute between Japan and South Korea which is caught
up in broader issues of history. This case, therefore, provides a useful example
for us to understand how the ‘history problem’ continues to be produced and
reproduced in the Japan-ROK relationship more broadly.
Memory, identity and international politics
International politics are consistently shaped by memories of the past; in
particular, these memories frequently inform contemporary national identi-
ties which interact with foreign policymaking. In this section, I discuss exist-
ing theorising of the role of memory and identity in international politics,
before outlining the poststructuralist theoretical framework and method-
ology adopted in this article.
What memory/ies?
In existing IR scholarship regarding memory, there has been disagreement
as to conceptualisation. Jan-Werner M€uller, for example, has sought to dis-
tinguish collective memory from both history and myth, describing collect-
ive memory as ‘ahistorical’ and rejecting the ‘collapsing [of] one into the
other’ (M€uller, 2002, pp. 20, 22). Other scholars such as Duncan Bell (2003,
2006) have been more sensitive to the overlapping nature of these catego-
ries while still attempting to make some distinction; while Eric
Langenbacher (2010) has advocated a spectral typology of differing levels
of ‘interpretation’ – ‘thin’ for history, ‘heavy’ for memory, and ‘extreme’ for
myth. There are significant problems with M€uller’s juxtaposition of an
objective history with an ‘ahistorical’ collective memory; the telling of his-
tory is never value-free and many prominent stories of the past considered
as ‘history’ can be justifiably contested. In this regard, scholars such as
Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss argue that ‘the past is produced in the pre-
sent, rather than preceding it’ (Edkins, 2003, p. 34), such that ‘although
memory invokes a past as though it already exists, the past is produced
and continually reproduced in such articulations of memory’ (Zehfuss, 2007,
p. 259). Such scholars, contra M€uller, study memory broadly as
‘representation of the past’, with no efficacy seen in strictly distinguishing
between histories, collective memories and myths. While Bell and
Langenbacher’s overlapping categories are more sensitive to this perspec-
tive, it still appears unhelpful to lend much weight to such labels for my
purposes here. All representations of the past are intrinsically relevant,
whether we label them as history (e.g. in a textbook), collective memory
(e.g. remembrance of war), or myth (e.g. popular ancestral stories). These
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are all ways of remembering, and to attempt to divide neatly between them
adds little analytical value because all such remembering matters for these
purposes. Thus, in this article I adopt a broad understanding of memory as
representation of the past.
Theorising memory and identity in IR
Given this discussion, it is unsurprising that the IR scholars paying most attention
to memory have been constructivists and critical scholars – especially poststruc-
turalists. Constructivist attention tomemory generally stems from the importance
such scholars place on identity. Constructivists view identity as a social under-
standing of the self that ‘constitute[s] actors’ interests and shape[s] their actions’
(Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 266). Because state identity is produced through dif-
fering experiences and systems of meaning, it is understood to vary across states
– ‘an empirical question to be theorised within a historical context’ (Hopf, 1998,
p. 178). Katzenstein (1996) and Berger (1998), for example, have argued that
Japan and Germany possess anti-militarist identities stemming from each’s
experience of the Second World War and its aftermath. These identities, it is
argued, have shaped their foreign policies in the form of a reluctance to engage
directly in international conflicts, and restrictions on their military forces and
weaponry. This example already alludes to the role that memory may play in the
constructivist analysis: If history shapes identities, this surely occurs through the
remembering of history. Langenbacher (2010, pp. 19, 21) has argued, in this
regard, that memory has a ‘prima facie empirical importance’ for constructivist
analyses of identity, given the ‘certification or validation of the existence of a self’
that memory provides. Berger (2002, pp. 79–80), meanwhile, argues that the
‘sense of identity’ that memory provides shapes political leaders’ understanding
of the world; thus, policy formulation ‘is shaped by collective memory’.
Nevertheless, such a ‘conventional’ constructivist position offers little theor-
isation of how memory informs these identities. Bell has argued that this lack of
‘explicit [and] sustained reflection’ on the role of memory by constructivists is
‘surprising’, given that ‘some account of historical memory is presupposed in
constructivist arguments about the constitution and reproduction of collective
identities’ (Bell, 2009, p. 349). As alluded to in the introduction, I argue that this
stems from a comparatively shallow account of identity formation more gener-
ally; one which tends to treat identity as the stable attribute of a unitary state.
Little attention is paid to the processes through which identities are (re)con-
structed, the existence of a diversity of possible identities, and the possibility of
their transformation as a result of domestic political processes (Zehfuss, 2001). If
conventional forms of constructivism cannot grapple with these processes, it is
unsurprising that they do not provide an explicit account of the role that mem-
ory plays in them.
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Poststructuralist approaches offer a deeper understanding of identity for-
mation and, by extension, the role that memory may play in this process.
Poststructuralists focus on representations of identity due to an ontological
perspective that the meaning afforded to identities is contingent and per-
formative, being (re)produced through discursive practices (Shapiro, 1988).
That is to say, identities have no ‘real’ existence outside of the meaning
ascribed to them by discourse. This perspective also views identities as rela-
tional; the identity of a Self is generally defined in opposition to (an)
Other(s) (Campbell, 1998). The term ‘undeveloped world’, for example, is
only afforded meaning through its juxtaposition with the ‘developed world’
(Doty, 1996). Furthermore, while identities are produced through structures
of discourse, these structures are inherently unstable and vulnerable to con-
testation, meaning that the forging of national identities is never complete.
Rather, dominant representations of national identity must be continually
reproduced to maintain their dominance (Campbell, 1998). Finally, post-
structuralists view identity as possessing not a causal relationship, but a
mutually constitutive relationship with foreign policy; identities both shape
and are shaped by foreign policy practices. Dominant representations of
national identity act to define the bounds of which foreign policies are per-
ceived as possible, imaginable, legitimate or even ‘natural’ (and which are
not); and, in turn, foreign policy practices contribute to the discursive
(re)production of national identities (Doty, 1993; Hansen, 2006). This mutual
constitution means that, while the practices of certain actors such as polit-
ical leaders may possess more discursive power than those of others, no
actor is pre-discursive – i.e. operating separately from, or ‘prior to’ discourse
(see Doty, 1997).
As a result of this theorisation of identity construction, poststructural-
ism also offers a clear path for understanding how memory may fit into
these processes. With a conceptualisation of memory as representation of
the past, we can understand it as a category of the discursive representa-
tions that (re)produce identities.2 In fact, for the national identities most
relevant to international politics, representations of the past are an espe-
cially key category given the frequency with which they appear in the
nation-building narratives of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 2016).
Put in other words, memory is frequently the discursive language spoken
when national identities are produced and reproduced. These national
identities, in turn, shape and are shaped by foreign policy practices, as
described above. This relatively uncomplicated and yet powerful theorisa-
tion of the role of memory and identity in international politics provides
the theoretical framework for my analysis of the ‘history problem’ in
Japan-South Korea relations.
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Discourse analytical methods for use in IR research have been outlined by
scholars such as Roxanne Lynn Doty (1993), Jennifer Milliken (1999) and
Lene Hansen (2006). Such scholars have resisted both Derridean notions of
deconstruction as anti-method (Derrida, 1967/2016) and neo-positivist
demands to ‘prove’ the importance of discourse through causal hypothesis
testing (cf. Keohane, 1988). Although most such analyses focus on a single
Self defined in opposition to an Other, here I examine a ‘discursive encoun-
ter’ (Hansen, 2006, p. 68): two opposing Selves constructed in relation to
each other/Other. In particular, I employ the discourse analytical ‘tools’ of
presuppositions (background knowledge assumed to be understood), sub-
ject positions (subjects and objects produced in relation to other subjects
and objects), and predicates (labels attached to subjects and objects).
Together, these three textual mechanisms produce a world which contains
various subjects and objects, endowed with particular attributes, positioned
in relation to one another (Doty, 1993, pp. 306–308). With regard to mem-
ory, I follow the suggestion of Resende and Budryte (2016, p. 2) – who
themselves draw upon Jeffrey Olick (2007) – to make use of memory as a
‘sensitising concept’, so as to ‘draw our attention to the importance of rep-
resentations of the past [… ] in the construction of group identities’.
However, my analysis is sensitive to both discourses of remembering and
forgetting, the latter of which may be marked not only by exhortations to
forget but also by an absence of certain representations of the past
(Zehfuss, 2007).
To undertake my analysis, I gathered relevant Japanese and South
Korean texts which relate to the trade dispute: official texts (speeches and
statements of national leaders, foreign ministers etc.); and media texts (edi-
torials published by a left-leaning newspaper and right-leaning newspaper
in each country). In doing so, I have concentrated on official/dominant dis-
courses as those most relevant to contemporary foreign policymaking, but
with some sensitivity to broader debates contained in the media which
may both illustrate the extent of recirculation of official discourses in soci-
ety and provide at least some indication of the existence of alternative dis-
courses.3 I also limited my text gathering to 2019, as this period included
more than enough material to substantiate my arguments and the Covid-
19 pandemic also decreased the salience of the trade dispute for a period
from early 2020. Relevant texts were identified by performing word
searches of key terms in databases and/or within texts themselves.
Nevertheless, due to the importance of intertextuality (Kristeva, 1980), I also
analysed further texts where these were linked to by, or were able to con-
textualise, my main texts. Given that I have analysed many more texts than
it is possible to specifically discuss in this article, I draw on the most
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representative examples of the discourses identified to provide evidence
for my arguments. Texts were analysed in their original language; I present
my own English translations here, accompanied by the original Japanese/
Korean where this is appropriate.
South Korea and the trade dispute: discourses of remembering
Export control measures placed on the ROK by the Japanese government in
summer 2019 covered a range of chemicals vital to the South Korean semi-
conductor and display manufacturing industries. While the Japanese gov-
ernment denied that these measures constituted a reprisal against the ROK
court decisions regarding colonial forced labour, this connection was con-
sistently made by Seoul from the outset. In July, for example, President
Moon made public statements arguing that ‘Japan’s unprecedented tying
of history-related issues to economic ones at this time is truly ill-advised’
(Moon, 2019c). By August, his language became more explicit, characteris-
ing the Japanese measures as ‘obvious trade retaliation’ (myongbaek-han
muyok pobok) against the court rulings (Moon, 2019e). The term ‘retaliation’
(pobok) was then repeatedly used to describe Japan’s measures by Moon
throughout this period (Moon, 2019h, 2019i, 2019j). This characterisation
was also consistently articulated in both conservative and progressive
media sources. Multiple editorials published by the conservative Chosun
Ilbo – while, unsurprisingly, not praising the progressive Moon administra-
tion – used the term ‘pobok’ to refer to Japan’s measures (Chosun Ilbo,
2019b, 2019c). During the same period, editorials published by the progres-
sive Hankyoreh went even further, characterising Japan’s measures as
‘cowardly trade retaliation’ (chollyol-han muyok pobok) (Hankyoreh, 2019a).
In this way, a discourse framing the Japanese export control measures as
part and parcel of the forced labour dispute was immediately dominant in
South Korea across the political spectrum. This was, essentially, the presup-
posed reality of the trade dispute.
This narrative was a vital pre-requisite to enveloping the trade dispute in
the broader discourses of the ‘history problem’, making the mobilisation of
representations of the past – posing Japan as a colonial aggressor Other
against the (South) Korean victim Self – more legitimate. Japan’s trade
measures were frequently narrated by the Moon administration as an
aggressive ‘attack’ (t’agyok) (Moon, 2019a), and a deliberate attempt to
harm South Korea (Moon, 2019f). More overtly, Moon also referred to the
‘deep wounds’ (kip’un sangch’o) between Korea and Japan due to
‘unfortunate history’ (pulhaeng-han kwagosa), which ‘Japan, the aggressor’
(kahaeja-in ilbon) was reopening with its actions in the trade dispute
(Moon, 2019e). On the anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese
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colonial rule, Moon encapsulated much of this discourse in his tele-
vised address:
As a victim of great suffering from Japanese imperialism in the past, we, for
our part, cannot help but take Japan’s ongoing economic retaliation very
seriously. It is even more so because this economic retaliation is in itself
unjustifiable and also has its roots in historical issues. This is why our
attitude towards this Liberation Day has become still more resolute.
(Moon, 2019i)
Progressive media also reproduced this historical framing of Japan’s actions
in the trade dispute. Hankyoreh editorials, argued that, rather than introduc-
ing export control measures, Japan should seek to address its ‘previous vio-
lations of human rights’ (Hankyoreh, 2019a), while criticising as an ‘absurd
position’ the idea that Koreans were at fault for seeking to address historical
injustices (Hankyoreh, 2019c). In this way, we can see how explicitly Japan’s
trade measures were framed as synonymous with its previous colonial
behaviour through the mobilisation of representations of the past. In doing
so, these Othering discourses repeatedly drew on the trope of Japan as ‘a
country that does not remember its past’ (kwago-rul kiok-haji anun nara)
(Moon, 2019f); an unrepentant colonial aggressor, still guilty of the same
sins due to its failure to remember.
This discursive (re)production of a Japanese Other also provided the rela-
tional context for the (re)production of a (South) Korean Self. If the trade
dispute was the repetition of Japanese attempts to dominate Korea, then –
as in the colonial period – Koreans must unite to resist this domination and
ensure that they ‘never again lose to Japan’ (Moon, 2019e). In this regard,
while remaining critical of Japan’s actions, Moon repeatedly framed the dis-
pute as an opportunity to ‘reaffirm our confidence in “doing it ourselves”’,
increasing South Korea’s self-sufficiency and bolstering its competitiveness
so as not just to match but even overtake Japan (Moon, 2019d, 2019g,
2019i, 2019k). Such exhortations were at times made more subtly: At a
‘Blue Economy’ ceremony in Chollanam-do, for example, Moon referred at
the outset of his speech – without any direct connection to the topic at
hand – to ‘Japan’s sixteenth century invasions of Korea’ and reminded the
audience that it was residents of this region who ‘protected the country’,
implicitly encouraging them to do the same now (Moon, 2019b). Similarly,
in a speech regarding the maritime and fishing industry, Moon began his
remarks by noting, again somewhat tenuously, that the location of the
event was part of the ancient Paekje kingdom, which was responsible for
‘transmitting advanced culture to Japan’ (Moon, 2019m). These speeches
made no explicit mention of Japan’s export controls, but their clear allusion
to Korean resistance in the face of Japanese aggression and historical one-
upmanship over Japan are prime examples of the Moon administration’s
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repeated discursive moves both to situate the trade dispute within a par-
ticular historical context and to galvanise a proud and united (South)
Korean Self in the face of an aggressive Japanese Other. South Koreans
were also reminded of this battle against Japan in other contexts: On
Hangul Day – the celebration of the Korean script – for example, Moon
described how ‘during Japanese colonial rule, saving hangul itself was a
movement for independence’, reminding the public that those who studied
hangul at the time risked torture and imprisonment at the hands of the
Japanese (Moon, 2019l). In this allusion, South Koreans were reminded of
their historical responsibilities regarding resistance against the Japanese
colonial oppressor. As with representations of Japan, these discourses of
national resistance were also reproduced in the progressive media.
Hankyoreh editorials repeated the assertion that the trade dispute was an
opportunity to accelerate the domesticisation of the semiconductor indus-
try (Hankyoreh, 2019b), as well as commending the ‘resolute response’
(tanho-han taeung) of the South Korean government and people
(Hankyoreh, 2019d), and advocating further ‘counterfire’ (matbul) against
Japan (Hankyoreh, 2019e).
This ‘resolute response’ was not limited only to industrial efforts to
domesticise production lines, but also the efforts of the public in the form
of a mass boycott of Japanese goods and services. Participation was so
widespread that Honda and Nissan saw sales in South Korea drop by
80–90% (Yonhap, 2019), and sales of Japanese beer in the month of August
fell by 97% (Kang, 2019). According to the Japan National Tourism
Organisation (2020), the number of South Korean tourists travelling to
Japan also fell by over 60% during the latter half of the year. Polling
showed increasing boycott participation over the course of the second half
of 2019, reaching over 70% of the South Korean public by November
(Xinhua, 2019). In some instances, actions went beyond a boycott and con-
stituted overt discrimination; multiple instances of hospitality venues refus-
ing entrance to Japanese customers were reported, for example (Kasulis,
2019). Opinion polls also revealed that the percentage of South Koreans
with a favourable impression of Japan dropped to record lows of almost
single digits (The Korea Times, 2019). While never explicitly calling for the
boycott, President Moon repeatedly commended the public for exhibiting
‘civil consciousness’ (shimin-uishik) in their ‘resolute opposition’ (kyoron-
hage pandae) to the Japanese measures (Moon, 2019h). In an end-of-year
address, Moon also praised ‘support from the public’ which had turned
Japan’s measures into a ‘blessing in disguise’ (Moon, 2019n). This signifi-
cantly widespread behaviour and public sentiment among the South
Korean public – itself engaged in the recirculation of the relational identity
discourses discussed above – illustrates the power of this discursive framing
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of the trade dispute and, within it, the identities of Japanese Other and
(South) Korean Self.
It should be noted, however, that this has been the dominant, but not
the only South Korean discourse of the trade dispute and related issues of
identity. A deeper investigation of the diversity that exists in this regard is
outside the scope of this article; however, at least noting its existence is
important for the development of this research agenda. While opposition
conservative politicians were consistently critical of Japan’s actions in the
dispute and sought to show unity in opposition to them, some have also
been critical of the Moon administration’s ‘appealing to the emotions of
[the] people with words’, rather than making ‘concrete plans’ to resolve the
dispute diplomatically (T. Kim, 2019). That said, it should be remembered
that previous conservative administrations have also engaged in the repro-
duction of (South) Korean identity in opposition to Japan through the use
of historical issues. For example, in 2012 Lee Myung-bak became the first
ROK president to land on the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands in a clear
attempt to utilise popular anti-Japanese nationalism to shore up his falling
approval ratings (Glosserman, 2020). In terms of the conservative media,
Chosun Ilbo editorials, while maintaining that the Japanese government’s
export controls were a retaliatory measure, at times have alluded to some
understanding regarding this retaliation from Japan’s perspective (see
Chosun Ilbo, 2019a, 2019d, 2019e). To be clear, then, this is not a strictly
partisan issue whereby progressives engage in anti-Japanese discursive
practices, and conservatives pro-Japanese; the reality is more nuanced.
Nevertheless, as illustrated by the boycott participation rates and opinion
polls discussed above, a (South) Korean identity which embodies negative
sentiment towards Japan is significantly widespread and has been domin-
ant during the trade dispute.
Through this analysis, therefore, we can observe that the dominant dis-
courses of the trade dispute in South Korea have represented the dispute
as part and parcel of the forced labour dispute, and thus the ‘history prob-
lem’ as a whole. This has allowed the trade dispute to be framed, through
representations of the past, as a site of ongoing struggle against the
Japanese colonial oppressor, ignorant of its history and thus doomed to
repeat its past aggressions. This battle – like the battle for Korea’s liberation
– is constructed as one to be fought by all (South) Koreans, united in their
resistance and determination to best their enemy.
Japan and the trade dispute: discourses of forgetting
Following the ROK court decisions regarding forced labour compensation,
the Abe administration was quick to threaten retaliation, with Foreign
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Minister Kono Taro warning of ‘firm measures’ in response (Kono, 2019a).
Yet, when Japan began to introduce export controls on the ROK in July
2019, these were explicitly described as ‘not retaliatory measures’ (taiko
sochi dewanai), with ‘absolutely no relation’ between them and the forced
labour issue (Kono, 2019h, 2019j). The Abe administration, instead, sug-
gested that its measures had been introduced due to national security con-
cerns (Kono, 2019i). The specifics of these concerns were never fully
explained, but Japanese media reports suggested that they related to lax
controls on the re-exporting to North Korea of chemicals with potential
military usages. Thus, similarly to the ROK administration’s connecting the
trade dispute with the forced labour issue as its foundational discursive
move, this insistence on the separateness of these issues set the narrative
basis for constructing the official discourse on the trade dispute in Japan.
These discourses framed both the trade dispute proper and the forced
labour issue through the supposedly ‘rational’ and ‘logical’ prism of inter-
national law. The Abe administration consistently asserted that the 1965
treaty normalising diplomatic relations between Japan and the ROK – and
its attached settlement agreements – resolved all legal claims of the South
Korean government and citizens in relation to the colonial period. Thus,
when no voice of repudiation against the court decisions came from the
ROK government, Tokyo accused Seoul of violating international law. This
characterisation was articulated on countless occasions. Foreign Minister
Kono, for example, stated that it was ‘unfortunate that the ROK had not cor-
rected its violation’ of the 1965 agreement (Kono, 2019b), while Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo – on the occasion that he directly discussed the dis-
pute (more rarely than President Moon) – called for ‘honouring the commit-
ments between the two countries, in accordance with following
international law’ (Abe, 2019). Even where he strayed close to admitting
that the trade measures were related to the ROK court decisions, Abe still
maintained that this was about legal agreements, not history:
The issue of former Korean labourers is not about a historical issue, but
about whether to keep the promise between countries under international
law … and what to do when the promise is broken. (Abe Shinzo, as cited in
Yamaguchi, 2019)
This rational, legal approach of the Japanese Self was contrasted with
the irrational, emotional approach of the Korean Other. Kono, for example,
stated regarding the forced labour dispute:
Regarding this matter, although the ROK side state that this is an emotional
issue and a legal issue, this is [in fact] a legal issue [only]. Thus, we are
asking [the ROK] to put the emotional part aside and properly deal with it
legally. (Kono, 2019d)
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Kono also stated that the ROK should refrain from ‘prioritising personal sen-
timents’ (kojin no kanjo o yusen suru) and instead focus on correcting its
breach of international law (Kono, 2019g). These Othering discourses draw
on long-held tropes of Koreans as emotional and prone to anger that stem
from Japanese stereotypes used to justify colonial rule over a century ago
(Chi Kim, 2017).4 Similar narratives were also articulated for contemporary,
tangentially related ROK-Japan disputes. For example, on the subject of
South Korean prohibitions on the importing of products from Japan’s
Fukushima prefecture (the location of the 2011 nuclear meltdown), even
though a World Trade Organisation panel had found in favour of Seoul’s
appeal on the dispute (Reuters 2019), Japan claimed that the ROK was not
‘following science’ with regard to assessing the safety of the relevant prod-
ucts, implying that Seoul was instead acting by other irrational means
(Kono, 2019f). On occasion, this representation of South Korea as irrational
was articulated more explicitly: At a Ministry of Foreign Affairs press confer-
ence in August, for example, Kono referred to the ROK’s threatening to ter-
minate a military information sharing agreement between the two
countries (GSOMIA), as well a ‘series of other recent actions vis-a-vis Japan’,
as ‘exceedingly negative and irrational’ (kiwamete hiteiteki katsu higoriteki)
(Kono, 2019k). In notable contrast, Japan’s own export control measures
were represented as a logical consequence of rational national security con-
cerns and fully in compliance with international law (Seko, 2019a, 2019b).
These were not retaliatory measures; baseless retaliation being something a
rational actor would not engage in. Indeed, even when Japan had threat-
ened retaliatory action earlier in the year, it was careful to frame this as a
threat to take measures ‘based on international law’ (Kono, 2019a).
As in South Korea, the relational construction of Japanese and (South)
Korean identities during the trade dispute also extended to broader atti-
tudes to history, marked in Japan, however, by discourses of forgetting. In
the official Japanese discourse, such matters of history are to be settled (or
have already been settled) by legal agreement, which must then be
respected and undisturbed. Emotion, sentiment or even reflection on the
past is unwarranted. Throughout the dispute, when broader issues of his-
tory have been raised, Tokyo has insisted on a ‘future-orientated’ (mirai
shiko) relationship with Seoul (Kono, 2019e), with a constant aversion to
even discussing such issues because they are ‘settled’ (see also Tamaki,
2010). This is already apparent in much of the language discussed above,
but Seoul’s remembering of these historical issues in the context of the
trade dispute was also explicitly criticised by the Abe administration, often
posing Japan as the ‘victim’ of a Korean vindictiveness regarding the past.
For example, when the Speaker of the ROK’s National Assembly referred to
the Japanese emperor’s supposed war guilt, Kono criticised this as
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‘exceedingly impolite and unacceptable’ (kiwamete burei de ari, ukeiregatai),
and demanded an apology and retraction (Kono, 2019c). The justification
for such responses was grounded in the ‘settled’ nature of these disputes,
with no desire to engage in the substance of what was being alleged. This
Japanese approach was consistently contrasted with representations of the
South Korean approach, which – combined with the accusations of emo-
tionalism and sentimentality described above – was framed as an attempt
to rewrite history. In this Japanese narrative, however, this ‘history’ refers
specifically to the 1965 agreements; not the relevant colonial and war his-
tory. In an August press conference, for example, Kono responded to South
Korean accusations that Japan had a poor understanding of history by stat-
ing that the most important issue of history currently between the two
countries ‘is about the 1965 agreement’, and that ‘if the ROK wants to
rewrite history, they should understand that it cannot be done’ (Kono,
2019l). In this way, official Japanese discourses perhaps can be seen as
encouraging the ‘remembering’ of at least one element of bilateral history
– the 1965 agreements – even if reflection on the broader circumstances of
the agreements is unwarranted. In addition to such overt refusals to discuss
colonial and wartime history, such history has also often simply not
appeared in the official Japanese discourse regarding the trade dispute.
Japanese ministers, when discussing the trade dispute, generally would
only make any comment on the forced labour dispute, or other such mat-
ters, when they had specifically been raised by the ROK or, perhaps, by a
journalist at a press conference. In this way, official Japanese discourses of
forgetting have been marked not only by overt exhortations to forget, but
also by omissions of remembering at all.
The official discourse on the trade dispute – and the representations of
(South) Korean and Japanese identities contained within it – has also been
reproduced by media publications in Japan, particularly conservative media
more aligned with the government. Yomiuri Shimbun editorials in this
period reinforced the representational Self/Other contrast between Japan
and South Korea: The Japanese government’s framing of its export control
measures as separate from the forced labour issue was accepted without
question; multiple editorials regarding the trade dispute failed even to
mention the issue, reinforcing these discourses of forgetting (see, for
example, Yomiuri Shimbun, 2019b). Instead, the Abe administration’s logic
for the measures was reproduced fully, with detailed explanations as to
how the ROK has allowed the exporting of ‘strategic materials’ to ‘countries
that have a good relationship with North Korea’ (kitachosen no yukokoku)
such as Iran and Syria (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2019b). No explicit accusation
regarding exporting to North Korea was made in this editorial, but the char-
acterisation of Iran and Syria as countries friendly with the DPRK is clearly
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intended to plant this notion in the reader’s mind. Tokyo’s approach
was also contrasted with representations of Seoul’s approach: Moon Jae-in
was described as whipping up anti-Japanese public sentiment with ethno-
nationalist rhetoric (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2019a, 2019c), as well as acting
‘illogically’ (sujichigai) in the dispute (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2019b). These
actions were narrated as driven by an emotional desire to restore Korean
honour in relation to the past, rather than rational policymaking (Yomiuri
Shimbun, 2019e). Indeed, there was even suggestion that Moon probably
does not want to resolve the dispute given his irrational ‘fixed view’ against
Japan (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2019c). The supposed illogic of this approach was
further reinforced by consistent reproduction of the Japanese government’s
position that all historical claims regarding the forced labour issue have
already been settled. At times, commentary even veered into discourses of
danger, presenting South Korea as a country in which the safety of
Japanese citizens could not be guaranteed due to the boycott movement
and the anger of the South Korean public (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2019d). In this
way, the Abe administration’s discursive representation of a logical, rational
Japanese Self versus an emotional, irrational Korean Other was consistently
reproduced in the conservative media’s discussion of the trade dispute.
As in the South Korean case, however, it must be noted that this discourse
of the trade dispute and Japanese identity has not been the only discourse.
Certainly, the Japanese government’s frustration with the ROK has been felt
by a large proportion of the public; as in South Korea, opinion polling
showed a record low of those Japanese with favourable opinions of the ROK
(Kanaya, 2019). Nevertheless, throughout this period, significant elements of
Japanese politics, civil society and media were critical of the Abe administra-
tion’s actions in the trade dispute and attitude to history more generally.
Asahi Shimbun editorials, for example, were clear in their characterisation of
the export controls as retaliation against the ROK court decisions and consist-
ently positioned the ‘history problem’ as the root of the dispute, arguing that
Abe should not have such a ‘passive’ attitude to reflecting on the past (Asahi
Shimbun, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). Small protests against the Abe administration
even took place, while hundreds of intellectuals signed a petition arguing
that ‘South Korea is not the enemy’ (Shim, 2019). In this way, alternative dis-
courses of remembering are certainly present in Japan, regularly attempting
to contest official discourses of forgetting. This would be a fruitful avenue for
further development of this research agenda.
In contrast with the situation described in South Korea, therefore, from
this analysis we can observe that official Japanese discourses of the trade
dispute have represented it as entirely separate from the forced labour dis-
pute, with both being matters to be solved (or already solved) through
international law. In this regard, Japan’s forgetting of the past has been
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represented as logical and rational, operating under the tenets of inter-
national law, versus an emotional and irrational South Korean Other,
obsessed by the past.
Theorising the ‘history problem’
Mutually constitutive identities and foreign policies
The analyses of the previous two sections show how the trade dispute has
constituted a site for the discursive (re)production of Japanese and (South)
Korean identities vis-a-vis the other/Other. In the South Korean case, we
can observe the (re)production of a national identity constructed through
representations of the past that position Tokyo as a continuous threat to
Korea(ns). That is to say, through such representations of the past, (South)
Korea is positioned as still today the innocent victim of Japanese (colonial)
aggression, while Japan – ignorant of and unrepentant for its history – is
doomed to continue such behaviour. In this way, South Korea is understood
to be justified in continually demanding that Japan address its past because
that past has, in fact, never ended; it is still very much present. Thus, interac-
tions with Japan – including trade issues that might, at least on their sur-
face, not relate to colonial history – are consistently caught up in this
process of Othering the coloniser Japan while defining the victimised
(South) Korean Self. This situation exemplifies a mutually constitutive rela-
tionship between foreign policy and identity. On the one hand, this con-
struction of (South) Korean identity shapes ROK foreign policy towards
Japan in that it defines the scope of what is possible, imaginable, legitim-
ate, even ‘natural’ when interacting with Japan. The notion that a South
Korean government would engage in foreign policy that entirely ignores
the history of Japanese colonialism – especially in the face of a Japan that
seeks to minimise or forget this history – is virtually unthinkable within
these parameters of identity. At the same time, the discursive foreign policy
practices highlighted above contribute to the performative reproduction of
this national identity in their representation of a (South) Korean Self defined
relationally against the Japanese Other. In this way, South Korean foreign
policy and identity practices overlap and continually shape each other;
‘doing foreign policy’ is ‘doing identity’ to the extent that the two are
‘ontologically inseparable’ (Hansen, 2006, p. 24).
We can witness a similar phenomenon in the Japanese case. In contrast
with the ROK, the official Japanese discourse seeks to forget the past and
denies the relevance of Japan’s wartime and colonial actions to contempor-
ary politics. In seeking to ‘move on’ from history in this way, Japan is posi-
tioned as rational and logical, often framed through discourses of
international law. This Japanese identity is produced relationally through
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contrast with (South) Korea(ns), represented as emotional and irrational for
consistently seeking to address historical issues, unable to move past these.
In this way, Japan is understood to be justified in continually seeking to for-
get and move on from the past – demanding a ‘future-facing’ relationship
with the ROK – because this is the rational and logical position to take. As
per South Korea, we can view this as a mutually constitutive relationship
between Japanese identity and foreign policy vis-a-vis the ROK. This con-
struction of national identity shapes Japanese foreign policymaking in that
it defines the scope of what would be a legitimate and imaginable position
for the Japanese government to adopt on such issues; but these very for-
eign policy practices also performatively (re)produce this construction of
Japanese identity.
The importance of discourse
This perspective adds depth to conventional constructivist analyses, as well
as exposing many of the reasons for the inability of rationalist theories to
account for the features of this relationship. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, conventional constructivist analyses, while often noting the import-
ance of an ‘identity clash’ in this relationship, tend to be silent as to how
such identities are constructed, implicitly suggesting that they are some-
how a natural consequence of the relevant history. Such an approach
leaves many questions unanswered about how these identities come to
be this way. As this article attempts to show, a poststructuralist approach
that examines the discursive (re)production of Japanese and (South)
Korean identity, however, is able to point to relevant discourses and their
productive power to answer these questions. Secondly and relatedly, con-
structivist analyses pose these identities as resulting in a combative for-
eign policy, thereby implying a one-way causal relationship between
identity and foreign policymaking. Poststructuralist approaches supple-
ment this understanding by identifying the mutually constitutive insepar-
ability of Japanese/South Korean foreign policy and national identity.
Suggesting that identities influence foreign policy is only half the story (at
best) and misses out how foreign policy practices themselves performa-
tively reproduce these identities.
At the same time, rationalist scholars (and some conventional constructi-
vists) may question the importance of discourse here. For example, they
may argue that the ROK’s conduct has, at least to some extent, been a
‘rational’ response to threatening behaviour from a stronger economic
power, in essence stressing the ‘material reality’ of the trade dispute. Firstly,
poststructuralism sees this distinction between the material and discursive
as unhelpful; while acknowledging that a ‘real world’ external to thought
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exists, it determines that this ‘material’ world cannot be constituted (or
understood) other than through discursive representation (Laclau & Mouffe,
1985). That is to say, it is discursive practices which provide the meanings
that make the world comprehensible and there is no possibility of detach-
ing ourselves from this discursive realm to witness reality otherwise. By
extension, as David Campbell (1998) has argued with regard to representa-
tions of the Soviet threat in (re)producing ‘American’ identity, to constitute
a threat, events or actions must first be represented as a threat. The point
here is not to ‘maintain that the foreign policy of [Japan] was benign, nor
that [the ROK] wilfully fabricated a danger where none could be perceived’
(Campbell, 1998, pp. 137–138, with my substitutions of the relevant states),
but rather that these policies and actions and not others have been repre-
sented as a threat. It is this process of discursive construction that consti-
tutes the ‘reality’ of this relationship. This can be illustrated through
contrast with the Moon administration’s discursive representation of North
Korea. Discussion of what a neo-realist would likely call the very ‘material’
threat posed by North Korea is outside the scope of this article, but it suffi-
ces to say that the DPRK has the means to kill millions in Seoul within
minutes and has regularly engaged in aggressive rhetoric and actions
towards the ROK. Thus, in a rationalist framework it would be difficult to
deny that Pyongyang represents a far greater existential threat to Seoul
than does Tokyo. And yet this is the very opposite of the discursive repre-
sentations of the Moon administration, which has avoided representing the
DPRK as a threat and, instead, largely used language of generosity and fra-
ternity as part of a Sunshine Policy redux. Moreover, these contrasting dis-
cursive representations have powerful effects in terms of social
understanding. In this case, they have produced corresponding sentiment
among much of the South Korean public. Polls of South Koreans conducted
during the trade dispute showed, for example, significantly higher favour-
ability ratings for Kim Jong Un over Abe Shinzo, and for North Korea over
Japan (Asan Institute, 2019); while 61% of South Koreans viewed Japan as a
current military threat to the country (Johnson, 2019). It would be very diffi-
cult to justify such views based on a rationalist understanding of
‘material’ threats.
Similarly with Japan, it might be suggested that it is indeed logical and
rational for Tokyo to insist on forward-facing cooperation with Seoul.
Indeed, much mainstream IR research characterises such attention to issues
of history at the expense of cooperation as ‘irrational behaviour’ (Cha, 1999,
p. 1). I will not re-rehearse the theoretical discussion above; however, the
crucial point is that it is South Korea(ns), in particular, that are represented
as irrational and emotional for looking to the past, and, thus, Japanese pol-
icy in relation to the ROK that is rational and logical for not doing so. As
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well as this discourse drawing on long-held tropes pre-dating the trade dis-
pute, this was not a consistent position of the Abe administration with
regard to difficult Japanese history. In December 2016, for example, Abe
became the first Japanese post-war leader to visit Pearl Harbor to mourn
for the victims of Japan’s 1941 attack, having welcomed Barack Obama as
the first US president to visit Hiroshima earlier in the year. These visits were
a concerted attempt to use remembrance of the past at the sites of highly
emotionalised memorials to signal reconciliation between wartime enemies.
An Obama advisor stated that the visits ‘allowed us to jointly and directly
deal with even the most sensitive aspects of our shared history’ (The
Guardian, 2016). At no point did the Abe administration characterise such
an aim as emotional or irrational; on the contrary, it was an eager partici-
pant. What matters, therefore, is how such actions are represented, rather
than some rationalist framework of logic. The discursive practices of the
Japanese government have positioned certain bilateral reflection on diffi-
cult history as legitimate, and others not. These inconsistent positions prob-
lematise the notion that we can explain Tokyo’s actions from a perspective
that ignores the processes of discursive identity construction.
Reproducing the ‘history problem’
By extension, this perspective also allows us to understand how the broader
‘history problem’ is produced and reproduced. The dominant South Korean
and Japanese discourses of identity, in terms of their attitude to the rele-
vant colonial and wartime past, are diametrically opposed. On the one
hand we have a national identity that is reproduced through consistently
reflecting on this past and demanding that it be addressed; on the other,
we have a national identity that is reproduced through forgetting this past
and strongly objecting to its role in contemporary politics. These oppos-
itional representations of the past, therefore, constitute a clash not merely
in the sense of disagreement regarding the ‘facts’ of history (cf. Kimura,
2019), but regarding the role of the past in contemporary politics, informed
by (and in construction of) identities that rely on conflict regarding such
issues. In other words, the production and reproduction of (these versions
of) Japanese and (South) Korean identity depends on the adoption of
oppositional attitudes to this history so as to sustain their own coherence
and dominance. I have identified these discourses in the trade dispute –
arguing that this dispute has both been a product of and contributed to
the reproduction of these oppositional identities – but this is far from a
unique occurrence; this particular dispute is merely one manifestation of
the wider pattern of the ‘history problem’. Disputes regarding the ‘comfort
women’, Yasukuni Shrine and Dokdo/Takeshima, among others, are further
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examples of the same antagonistic foreign policy practices concerning the
past that both produce and are produced by these oppositional representa-
tions of identity.5
It is important to note, however, that it does not follow from this argu-
ment that such a situation is inevitable. This conflict is commonly repre-
sented in academic and journalistic literature as inexorable, with strong
hints of essentialism. While this article has concentrated on official and
dominant contemporary discourses of identity in Japan and South Korea, I
have repeatedly asserted that its theoretical perspective sees national iden-
tities as unstable and contingent and that alternative representations of
national identity exist in both the ROK and Japan, even if it is not possible
to address them in detail here. Such alternative discourses may contest and
attempt to transform the dominant conceptions of national identity in
these states. Nevertheless, the existence of this potential challenge also
acts to make the reproduction of the currently dominant national identities
all the more vital so as to sustain their dominance. Indeed, in the Japanese
case, it was a national identity perceived as overly ‘masochistic’ in relation
to the past that spurred Abe and his conservative revisionist peers to
attempt to recast Japanese identity in a prouder tradition (Hagstr€om &
Gustafsson, 2015; Oros, 2015). As discussed in the theory section, this
should not suggest a belief that discourse is something which may be fully
competently manipulated by pre-discursive actors, but the existence of
domestic political contestation over attitudes to the past in Japan has been
evident to any observer. It is, thus, entirely possible that future transforma-
tions of these identities and foreign policies may occur.
For now, though, Japan-South Korea relations are considered to be at
their lowest point since normalisation due to the ‘history problem’, and the
resignation of Abe Shinzo and ascendency of Prime Minister Suga
Yoshihide in September 2020 does not appear to have triggered imminent
improvement. The continual reality of this situation, however, is not simply
a natural result of the relevant history, nor is either state acting within the
bounds of a ‘rational’ framework. Instead, this reality is performatively
reproduced through discursive practices of identity construction which
both depend upon and make possible the foreign policies which constitute
the ‘history problem’.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to shed light on the processes by which the
socially constructed ‘history problem’ between Japan and South Korea is
produced and reproduced. I have illustrated the discursive processes
through which the recent trade dispute has been produced by, and acts to
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(re)produce, dominant national identities that clash in terms of their atti-
tudes to difficult history. On the one hand, we see the forging of a (South)
Korean identity that seeks to remember the past, positioning Japan as a
colonial aggressor – ignorant of and unrepentant for its history, and thus
repeating its purposeful oppression – which Koreans must resist. On the
other hand, we see the forging of a Japanese identity that seeks to forget
or at least minimise the contemporary relevance of this history – deeming
this the rational and logical position to take – while representing South
Koreans as emotional and irrational for continuing to dwell on the past. The
trade dispute, however, is but one manifestation of much broader conflict,
produced and reproduced by the clash that results from dominant contem-
porary identities which have a diametrically opposed attitude to shared his-
tory – the broader ‘history problem’. Across the bilateral relationship,
discourses of remembering this history are consistently mobilised by the
ROK, while discourses of forgetting are consistently mobilised by Japan. We
can view this as a mutually constitutive relationship between South Korean
and Japanese national identities and their respective foreign policies.
Further research which examines the discursive (re)construction of other
elements of the ‘history problem’, such as the ‘comfort women’ issue, may
generate additional findings which supplement and develop my analysis of
the trade dispute and related forced labour dispute, and deepen our under-
standing of Japanese and South Korean Self/Other identity discourses. Yet
we must also be careful not to reify the ‘history problem’. Although, in the
limited space available, this article has concentrated on official and domin-
ant discourses as those most relevant to contemporary foreign policy-
making, further research using a critical constructivist/poststructuralist
approach which examines in detail alternative discourses in both states
would also be extremely fruitful. As well as illustrating that the ‘history
problem’ is not inevitable due to the existence of such alternative dis-
courses, such research would help us understand how, and the extent to
which, the official and dominant identity discourses in these states are con-
tested. This may also give us a deeper understanding as to how they may
be transformed, fundamentally shifting the construction of the ‘history
problem’ in the future.
Notes
1. In this article I distinguish between ‘conventional constructivism’ on the one hand, and
‘critical constructivism’ or poststructuralism on the other. In this regard, I follow Hansen
(2006) in not recognising a distinction between the latter two and my discussion of
poststructuralism should not be considered as distinguished from a more critical
constructivism. Nevertheless, as not all scholars would label their work with such terms,
the most important factor here is the actual substance of the approaches, even if I use
these labels as a helpful heuristic device.
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2. Poststructuralist scholars have also termed these ‘historical representations’ (Bleiker &
Hoang, 2006) and ‘temporal representations’ (Hansen, 2006).
3. Further research that focuses on alternative identity discourses will also be an important
part of the research agenda I advocate here as their existence and potential as a source
of transformation of the status quo is of significant importance. Nevertheless, due to
space constraints, this article focuses on official/dominant discourses as a vital starting
point, but with sensitivity to the existence of alternatives throughout.
4. Though these have also been adopted by some Koreans as a national aesthetic termed
han. See Oh (2019) for an intriguing argument that the South Korean response to the
trade dispute has been emotional but has not been irrational.
5. For example, see Bukh (2015) for an analysis which also highlights the salience of a
rational Japanese Self versus an emotional (South) Korean Other in Japanese discourses
regarding the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.
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